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Book Review: Nuclear Weapons in the Information Age
Far from being obsolete in today’s information age, nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction have not only survived, but have become weapons for states that face security
threats, including perceived threats of nuclear blackmail, or expectation of conflicts. This study
focuses on this unplanned coexistence of two distinct arts of war, including the possibility that
states like the U.S. may be held hostage to nuclear blackmail by “outlier” regimes or terrorists,
such as North Korea. Ali Diskaya finds Stephen J. Cimbalas’s account of the dangers which
global human society is facing in the second nuclear age to be insightful, systematic and
comprehensive.
Nuclear Weapons in the Information Age. Stephen J. Cimbala.
Continuum. February 2012.
Find this book: 
The atomic bomb played a starring role in the polit ical, cultural and social
history of  the twentieth century. The ult imate weapon of  the industrial
age was used to end World War II and to deter war in history’s last great
power rivalry, the Cold War of  1945-91. The bomb that Oppenheimer and
his colleagues of  the Manhattan Project built in remote New Mexico was
never used again af ter Hiroshima and Nagasaki but has since morphed
into a thermonuclear weapon capable of  killing of f  civilisation.
In his book, Nuclear Weapons in the Information Age , Stephen J.
Cimbala, distinguished prof essor of  polit ical science at Penn State
Brandywine and f ormer consultant on arms control to various U.S.
government agencies, argues that the ult imate weapon of  the age of
mass destruction and total warf are still has a crit ical impact on peace and security in the
postindustrial age of  precision warf are and reduced collateral damage.
In his well-written and insightf ul study, Cimbala demonstrates that the unplanned coexistence of  nuclear
weapons with inf ormation-based concepts of  warf are increases the likelihood of  thermonuclear war
between the contemporary nuclear-weapon states (NWSs). According to Cimbala, the coexistence of  these
two distinct arts of  war may not play well together because of  the nature of  inf ormation warf are and the
sheer endless destructive power of  nuclear weapons. The main aim of  inf ormation or cyber warf are is to
attack enemy networks in order to disrupt, deny or destroy inf ormation. However, the use of  cyber warf are
by NWSs in a crisis may be dangerous because successf ul nuclear crisis management requires
transparency of  decision making processes and clear and uninterrupted communications. Cimbala warns
that a NWS in a serious polit ical crisis “f aced with a sudden burst of  holes in its vital warning and response
systems might, f or example, press the preemption button instead of  waiting to ride out the attack and then
retaliate” (p.206)
Furthermore, Cimbala contends that nuclear danger in the second nuclear age lies not only in the possible
outbreak of  all-out thermonuclear war between the existing NWSs, but also in the possible acquisit ion of
nuclear weapons by rogue states (e. g. Iran) and transnational terrorist groups with radical polit ical agendas
(e. g. al-Qaeda). Arguably, it remains very dif f icult f or states and non-state actors to acquire the bomb, but
the gradually diminishing status of  the nonprolif eration regime and the spread of  nuclear weapons
technology increase the opportunit ies f or the most dangerous weapons f alling into wrong hands. In short,
the coexistence of  nuclear weapons with inf ormation-based concepts of  warf are and the f urther spread of
nuclear weapons technology multiply the nuclear risks in the second nuclear age, including accidental war,
acquisit ion by rogue states and terrorists and the problems of  stability between NWSs in a serious polit ical
crisis.
The question now is how global human society can survive in an unregulated nuclear world, with a growing
number of  nuclear weapon states and the constant risk of  thermonuclear holocaust. Cimbala contends that
the best we can hope f or is a global ‘minimum deterrence regime’ headed by the United States and Russia.
The belief  that nuclear deterrence has largely eliminated the possibility of  nuclear war is common among
theorists of  international polit ics. According to this belief , the existence of  second-strike nuclear arsenals
discourages states f rom starting any wars that might lead to the use of  nuclear weapons. Cimbala argues
that a minimum deterrence regime between the United States and Russia “with a maximum number of  1,000
or 500 deployed long range weapons could certainly provide f or adequate numbers of  surviving and
retaliating weapons to ensure deterrence and crisis stability” (p.202). Once such a regime is established, it
could draw a f irm line against others joining the nuclear club and ensure that rogue states already in
possession of  nuclear weapons (e. g. North Korea) dismantle their weapons under international control.
This is a rather surprising conclusion since Cimbala argues throughout his book that the coexistence of
nuclear weapons with inf ormation-based concepts of  warf are increases the likelihood of  thermonuclear
war in t imes of  serious polit ical crisis. Additionally, many recent works on Cold War history reveal that ‘The
Bomb’ cannot rescue leaders f rom the mistrust, misperceptions and miscalculations that may lead to
deliberate or accidental nuclear war. The United States and the Soviet Union were willing to wage nuclear
war despite the certainty of  nuclear retaliation and despite both nations’ stable posit ion as international
superpowers. The accidental or deliberate use of  nuclear weapons came close to occurring on many
occasions during the Cold War; especially during the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis and the Able Archer crisis of
1983.
Cimbala is well aware of  these f acts but argues that a minimum deterrence regime is the most realistic
alternative to an unregulated nuclear world. Cimbala devotes one chapter to the idea of  nuclear abolit ion
(chapter 4) but concludes that global zero is not only improbable but also impractical because in a world
without nuclear weapons no one could guarantee that rogue states or anti systemic non-state actors might
secretly build the bomb. Is there an alternative to Cimbala’s minimum deterrence regime and a completely
disarmed world? Accepting the inevitability that nuclear weapons will be used again, a small group of
scholars argue that the only apparent way to put a permanent end to the possibility of  a global nuclear war
is to develop a ‘world nuclear government’, an entity that would control all nuclear weapons and materials
and ef f ectively limit the rights of  states and non-state actors to manuf acture nuclear weapons. Despite the
f act that the idea of  world government is now returning to the mainstream of  scholarly thinking about
international relations, Cimbala discusses its possibility in only one paragraph and concludes that its
achievement is even less realistic than global zero since no state would ever give up its sovereignty.
Nevertheless, Cimbala ignores many recent works of  leading scholars on world government which
demonstrate that it could actually exist as a small, f ederal authority rather than global Leviathan.
Cimbalas’s account of  the dangers which global human society is f acing in the second nuclear age is
insightf ul, systematic and comprehensive. Nonetheless, where his book f alls short is to of f er a thorough
discussion of  viable alternatives to a nuclear-armed world. His dismissal of  global zero and world
government as utopian solutions to the problem of  global nuclear war takes not into account the possibility
of  change over t ime in the role and appeal of  nuclear weapons. On the other hand, this is also a strength,
as Cimbala’s pessimism reminds us of  the constraints our actions have to account f or when trying to
change the contemporary nuclear order.
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